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Introduction
On a filtered probability space (Ω, F, P, F = (F t ) t=0,... ,T ), let us consider A := inf ρ sup τ EU (ρ, τ ) and A := sup τ inf ρ EU (ρ, τ ), (1.1) where U (s, t) is F s∨t -measurable and ρ, τ are F-stopping times taking values in {0, . . . , T }. When U (s, t) = f s 1 {s<t} + g t 1 {s≥t} in which f t and g t are bounded F-adapted processes, the problem above is said to be a Dynkin game (see, e.g., [1, ). It is well-known that if f ≥ g then A = A. However, it may fail that A = A in general even for some other natural choices of U . Consider U (s, t) = |f s − f t |. This means in the game (1.1), Player "inf" tries to match Player "sup". Let f t = t, t = 0, . . . , T and the problem becomes deterministic. It is easy to see that A = ⌈T /2⌉ > 0 = A. So the game is not fair.
On the other hand, when playing game (1.1), Players "inf" and "sup" can adjust their stopping strategies according to each other's stopping behavior. Therefore, it is more reasonable to incorporate a stopping strategy that can be adjusted according to the other's behavior. That is, we consider the stopper-stopper problem where ρ, τ ∈ T , and ρ ρ ρ(·), τ τ τ (·) : T → T satisfy certain non-anticipativity conditions, where T is the set of stopping times.
One possible definition of non-anticipative stopping strategies (we denote the collection of them as T i ) would be that, ρ ρ ρ ∈ T i , if ρ ρ ρ : T → T satisfies either ρ ρ ρ(σ 1 ) = ρ ρ ρ(σ 2 ) ≤ σ 1 ∧ σ 2 or ρ ρ ρ(σ 1 ), ρ ρ ρ(σ 2 ) > σ 1 ∧ σ 2 , ∀σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ T .
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That is, ρ ρ ρ = ρ ρ ρ(τ ) can be adjusted according the previous (but not current) behavior of τ . However, using this definition, it may be the case that
Below is an example.
Then there are only two elements, ρ ρ ρ 0 and ρ ρ ρ 1 , in T i , with ρ ρ ρ 0 (0) = ρ ρ ρ 0 (1) = 0 and ρ ρ ρ 1 (0) = ρ ρ ρ 1 (1) = 1. It can be shown that B = 1 and B = 0.
Another possible definition of non-anticipative stopping strategies (we denote the collection as
That is, ρ ρ ρ = ρ ρ ρ(τ ) can be adjusted according both the previous and the current behavior of τ . However, under this definition, it may be the case that
We still use Example 1.1 as an example. Example 1.2. Let T = 1 and U (s, t) = |f s − f t | = 1 {s =t} with f t = t, t = 0, 1. Then in this case T ii is the set of all the maps from T to T . By letting ρ ρ ρ(0) = 0 and ρ ρ ρ(1) = 1, we have that C = 0. By Letting τ τ τ (0) = 1 and τ τ τ (1) = 0, we have that C = 1.
Observe that B = C and B = C in Examples 1.1 and 1.2. In fact it is by no means a coincidence as we will see later in this paper. That is, we always have
An intuitive reason for using both T ii for ρ ρ ρ and T i for τ τ τ is that, in order to let the game be fair, at each time period we designate the same player (here we choose "sup") to act first. (Note that both "to stop" and "not to stop" are actions.) So this player ("sup") can only take advantage of the other's ("inf's") previous behavior (as opposed to "inf" taking advantage of "sup's" current behavior in addition).
In this paper, we analyze the problems associated to V and V . We show that these problems can be converted into a corresponding Dynkin game, and that V = V = V , where V is the value of the Dynkin game. We also provide the optimal ρ ρ ρ(·) ∈ T ii and τ τ τ (·) ∈ T i for V and V respectively.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce the setup and the main result. We provide two examples in Section 3. In Section 4, we give the proof of the main result. Finally we give some insight for the corresponding problems in continuous time in Section 5.
The setup and the main result
Let (Ω, F, P ) be a probability space, and F = (F t ) t=0,... ,T be the filtration enlarged by P -null sets, where T ∈ N is the time horizon in discrete time.
We shall often omit "a.s." when a property holds outside a P -null set. Let T t be the set of Fstopping times taking values in {t . . . , T }, and T := T 0 . We define the stopping strategies of Type I and Type II as follows:
Definition 2.1. ρ ρ ρ is a stopping strategy of Type I (resp. II), if ρ ρ ρ : T → T satisfies the "nonanticipativity" condition of Type I (resp. II), i.e., for any σ 1 , σ 2 ∈ T ,
(2.1)
Denote T i (resp. T ii ) as the set of stopping strategies of Type I (resp. II).
Remark 2.1. We can treat T as a subset of T i and T ii (i.e., each τ ∈ T can be treated as the map with only one value τ ). Hence we have T ⊂ T i ⊂ T ii .
Consider the problem
We shall convert this problem into a Dynkin game. In order to do so, let us introduce the following two processes that will represent the payoffs in the Dynkin game.
(2.5)
By the classic optimal stopping theory, there exist an optimizer ρ u (t) ∈ T t for V 1 t , and an opti-
Define the corresponding Dynkin game as follows:
where the second equality above follows from (2.5). Moreover, there exists a saddle point (ρ d , τ d ) described by
That is,
Below is the main result of this paper.
Theorem 2.1. We have that
Besides, there exists ρ ρ ρ * ∈ T ii and τ * : T ii → T described by
7)
and
Similarly, there exists τ τ τ * * ∈ T i and ρ * * : T i → T described by
9)
Remark 2.2. In the definition (2.8) τ * (·) is a map of ρ ρ ρ instead of a stopping time. But once the outside ρ ρ ρ is given, τ * (ρ ρ ρ) would become a stopping time, and thus this shall cause no problem in our definition of τ * . (To convince oneself, one may think of inf x sup y f (x, y) = inf x f (x, y * (x)).) We shall often simply write τ * and omit its dependence of ρ ρ ρ.
(Here τ * = τ * (ρ ρ ρ * ) as we indicated in Remark 2.2.) Moreover,
(2.10)
Similar results hold for V .
where the second equality follows from that ρ ρ ρ * (τ
where the second equality follows from that τ * = τ d on {τ d ≤ ρ d }.
Examples
In this section we provide two examples within the setup of Section 2. The first example shows that in the classical Dynkin game one does not need to use non-anticipative stopping strategies. The second example is a relevant problem from mathematical finance in which our results can be applied. This problem is on determining the optimal exercise strategy when one trades two different American options in different directions.
3.1. Dynkin game using non-anticipative stopping strategies. Let
where (f t ) t and (g t ) t are F-adapted, satisfying f ≥ g. Then we have that
Then by Theorem 2.1 we have that
Besides, by the property of U , the ρ ρ ρ * and τ τ τ * * defined in (2.7) and (2.9) can w.l.o.g. be written as ρ ρ ρ = ρ d and τ τ τ = τ d .
Therefore, in the Dynkin game, using non-anticipative stopping strategies is the same as using a usual stopping time.
Remark 3.1. In this example we let ρ ρ ρ ∈ T ii and τ τ τ ∈ T i . The same conclusion holds if we let ρ ρ ρ ∈ T i and τ τ τ ∈ T ii instead.
A robust utility maximization problem. Let
where U : R → R is a utility function, and f and g are adapted to F. Consider
This problem can be interpreted as the one in which an investor longs an American option f and shorts an American option g, and the goal is to choose an optimal stopping strategy to maximize the utility according to the stopping behavior of the holder of g. Here we assume that the maturities of f and g are the same (i.e., T ). This is without loss of generality. Indeed for instance, if the maturity of f ist < T , then we can define f (t) = f (t) for t =t + 1, . . . , T .
Proof of Theorem 2.1
We will only prove the results for V , since the proofs for V are similar.
Lemma 4.1. For any σ ∈ T , ρ u (σ) ∈ T and τ u (σ) ∈ T .
Proof. Take σ ∈ T . Then for t ∈ {0, . . . , T }
Lemma 4.2. ρ ρ ρ * defined in (2.7) is in T ii and τ * defined in (2.8) is a map from T ii to T .
Proof. Take τ ∈ T . We have that
Hence ρ ρ ρ * (τ ) ∈ T . Similarly we can show that τ * (ρ ρ ρ) ∈ T for any ρ ρ ρ ∈ T ii . It remains to show that ρ ρ ρ * satisfies the non-anticipative condition of Type II in (2.1). Take τ 1 , τ 2 ∈ T . If ρ ρ ρ * (τ 1 ) < τ 1 ∧ τ 2 ≤ τ 1 , then τ 1 > ρ d and thus ρ ρ ρ * (τ 1 ) = ρ d < τ 1 ∧ τ 2 ≤ τ 2 , which implies ρ ρ ρ * (τ 2 ) = ρ d = ρ ρ ρ * (τ 1 ) < τ 1 ∧ τ 2 . If ρ ρ ρ * (τ 1 ) ≥ τ 1 ∧ τ 2 , then if ρ ρ ρ * (τ 2 ) < τ 1 ∧ τ 2 we can use the previous argument to get that ρ ρ ρ * (τ 1 ) = ρ ρ ρ * (τ 2 ) < τ 1 ∧ τ 2 which is a contradiction, and thus ρ ρ ρ * (τ 2 ) ≥ τ 1 ∧ τ 2 .
Proof. Recall ρ ρ ρ * defined in (2.7) and ρ d defined in (2.6). We have that
Lemma 4.4.
Proof. Take ρ ρ ρ ∈ T ii . Recall τ * defined in (2.8). By the non-anticipativity condition of Type II in (2.1),
where in (4.1) we used the fact that τ u (t) ≥ t + 1 if t < T (in the first conclusion).
where the fifth inequality follows from the definition of V 1 in (2.3) and the fact that ρ ρ ρ(τ * ) ≥ τ d on {ρ ρ ρ(τ d ) ≥ τ d }. As this holds for arbitrary ρ ρ ρ ∈ T ii , the conclusion follows.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. This follows from Lemmas 4.1-4.4.
Some insight into the continuous-time version
We can also consider the continuous time version of the stopper-stopper problem. If we want to follow the argument in Section 4, there are mainly two technical parts we need to handle as opposed to the discrete-time case, which are as follows.
• We need to make sure that V 1 and V 2 defined in (2.3) and (2.4) have RCLL modifications.
• On an intuitive level, the optimizers (or choose to be ǫ-optimizers in continuous time) ρ u (·) and τ u (·) are maps from T to T . Yet this may not be easy to prove in continuous time, as opposed to the argument in Lemma 4.2.
In order to address the two points above, we may have to assume some continuity of U in (s, t) (maybe also in ω). On the other hand, with such continuity, there will essentially be no difference between using stopping strategies of Type I and using stopping strategies of Type II, as opposed to the discrete-time case (see Examples 1.1 and 1.2).
